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Abstract
Individual labor earnings observed in worker panel data have complex, highly persistent dy-
namics. We investigate the capacity of a structural job search model with i.i.d. productivity
shocks to replicate salient properties of these dynamics, such as the covariance structure of earn-
ings, the evolution of individual earnings mean and variance with the duration of uninterrupted
employment, or the distribution of year-to-year earnings changes. Specifically, we show within
an otherwise standard job search model how the combined assumptions of on-the-job search and
wage renegotiation by mutual consent act as a quantitatively plausible “internal propagation
mechanism” of i.i.d. productivity shocks into persistent wage shocks. The model suggests that
wage dynamics should be thought of as the outcome of a specific acceptance/rejection scheme
of i.i.d. productivity shocks. This offers an alternative to the conventional linear ARMA-type
approach to modelling earnings dynamics. Structural estimation of our model on a 10-year
panel of highly educated British workers shows that our simple framework produces a dynamic
earnings structure which is remarkably consistent with the data.
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1 Introduction
Individual labor earnings, as they are observed from worker panel data, follow a complex and as
yet not fully understood dynamic pattern. While no claim has been made so far to discovery of the
“true” earnings process, the (numerous) existing empirical analyses of this process seem to concur
on a twofold conclusion.1 First, earnings shocks are highly persistent over time. Second, it takes a
fairly rich mix of random processes to replicate the intricate autocovariance structure of earnings.
Indeed the archetypal ARMA-type decomposition of the individual earnings process features a
martingale or a highly persistent Markov component, on top of a fixed-effect and a transitory
(MA) shock. While the dynamic properties of individual earnings—notably persistence—are well
diagnosed by this reduced-form approach, the economic mechanisms at the root of these properties
are still unknown.
In this paper we aim to contribute to the study of individual earnings dynamics by investigating
the capacity of a structural model of job search with simple i.i.d. productivity shocks to capture the
main aspects of observed earnings processes. Specifically, we show how the combined assumptions
of on-the-job search (with search frictions) and wage renegotiation by mutual consent can act as
a realistic “internal propagation mechanism” of i.i.d. productivity shocks. This combination of
assumptions, which we shall motivate momentarily, implies that purely transitory productivity
shocks are translated into persistent wage shocks with a covariance structure that we find to be
consistent with the data.2
The intuitive mechanism at work is as follows. Consider firms and workers who are matched in
pairs, each match facing an idiosyncratic productivity (or “match quality”) shock in every period.
Also assume that, through on-the-job search, workers occasionally contact outside firms who then
1The related literature is literally huge. A somewhat arbitrary selection includes the seminal papers by Lillard
and Willis (1978), Lillard and Weiss (1979), MaCurdy (1982) and Abowd and Card (1989), the comprehensive
comparative analysis of recent developments by Alvarez, Browning and Ejrnæs (2001), Blundell and Preston (1998)
for an application to U.K. data, and Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) as an example of a state-of-the-art paper in this
field.
2Of course it is not our contention that i.i.d. productivity shocks is by any standards a “better” assumption than
any different, more complicated ARMA process. We view one of our contributions as the identification and analysis
of a potential endogenous explanation of income persistence, given the least possible persistent process for what we
now refer to as “productivity” and will in fact cover the broader concept of “match quality” in the model.
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compete over their services with their current employer. Because of search frictions, worker-firm
pairings produce a positive surplus which the wage rate splits into the worker’s value and the
employer’s profit. In this process, the maximum wage that the firm is willing to pay leaves the firm
with zero profit and follows productivity shocks. The minimum wage that the worker is willing to
receive yields the worker her/his outside option value, i.e. the value of unemployment, except in
periods when the worker raises an outside offer, in which case it equals the value of this offer. As
wages can only be renegotiated by mutual consent, neither party can force the other to renegotiate
if the latter is not willing to do so. Three distinct situations then arise. First, if the match receives
a sufficiently adverse productivity shock to make it unprofitable for the firm to keep employing the
worker at her/his current wage, then the firm has a credible threat to fire the worker which it can
use to renegotiate the wage downward. Second, whenever the worker receives an outside job offer
paying a higher wage than her/his current wage, s/he can credibly threaten to accept it in order
to force her/his employer into upward wage renegotiation. This will lead to an efficient separation
if the outside offer is greater than the maximum wage the firm is able to pay. Finally, in any other
event (i.e. no sufficiently adverse productivity shock and no sufficiently good outside job offer),
neither party is in a position to force the other to renegotiate, and the wage remains unchanged.
The wage is only altered when one of those “outside options” constraints becomes binding, in
which case it is renegotiated up or down by just enough to satisfy whichever constraint is binding.
Indeed the pattern of wage dynamics implied by the model just sketched can be summarized
graphically as in Figure 1 (which we adapt from MacLeod and Malcomson, 1993): because of
search frictions and the rule of mutual consent, i.i.d. productivity shocks are only infrequently
translated into wage shocks, hence wage shock persistence.
< Figure 1 about here. >
The intuitive idea that renegotiation by mutual consent likely causes some form of “price stick-
iness” has been around for a while (as studies surveyed by Malcomson, 1997, suggest). Yet, our
paper is, inasmuch as we know, the first to formalize it in the context of a structural job search
model and to provide a quantitative analysis of the resulting individual income dynamics.
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Specifically, our theoretical model can be seen as a version of the matching model of labor market
equilibrium, now routinely referred to as the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides, or “DMP” model,3 in
which employed job search is allowed. Although virtually any wage formation mechanism can be
embedded into the DMP model, the typical (and by far dominant) practice is to assume a Nash-like
sharing rule, whereby each party receives a given share of the match surplus at all times. Hidden
underneath this constant-share feature is the assumption that wages are renegotiated at least every
time the match is hit by a productivity shock. This assumption is somewhat arbitrary as in general
the occurrence of a shock to match productivity does not give either of the matched partners a
credible threat to force the other to renegotiate. As advocated by, e.g., Malcomson (1997, 1999),
renegotiation by mutual consent is a more natural assumption, at least for its consistency with a
number of legal and/or economic facts.4
Besides formalizing the above theoretical mechanism, we show that its quantitative implications
are remarkably well borne out by the data: we estimate our structural model on a sample of high-
educated British workers taken from the BHPS and provide an in-depth fit analysis of the model.
In so doing, we contribute to the growing body of research carrying out structural estimation of
various forms of search models (see Eckstein and Van den Berg, 2005, for a survey), which so
far concentrated wage dispersion, mostly relying on the cross-sectional dimension of the data and
leaving aside the question of individual earnings dynamics. By contrast, we exploit as much as
possible the observed dynamics of individual labor income, as is allowed by the long longitudinal
dimension of our panel and the rich dynamic predictions of our model.
3From Diamond (1982) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). For a complete exposition of the DMP model and
many extensions thereof, see Pissarides (2000).
4Mutual agreement is indeed a prerequisite to wage renegotiation under English law, which is relevant to the data
we use in the latter part of this paper. In the U.S., while the employment-at-will doctrine would in principle leave
scope for more responsiveness of wages to productivity shocks, the empirical evidence reviewed in Malcomson (1997,
1999) reveals that wage changes occur much less frequently than would be consistent with a strict application of the
employment-at-will rule, suggesting that mutual consent, although not an explicit legal provision in the U.S., may
nonetheless be common practice.
On the theory side, the assumption of renegotiation by mutual consent was already implemented within the
standard DMP model (without on-the-job search) by Fella (2004). However, ignoring on-the-job search leads to the
counterfactual prediction that wage profiles unambiguously (stochastically) decline over the job spell. On the other
hand, existing versions of the DMP model with on-the-job search (Pissarides, 2000 chapter 4, Shimer, 2005), mostly
shut down between-employer competition by assuming that the worker’s outside option is always unemployment,
even when s/he winds up with an outside job offer. This, combined with the assumption that wages are renegotiated
every time a shock hits the match, implies that individual wages fluctuate along with match productivity.
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But most importantly, we offer a structural counterpart to the aforementioned “reduced-form”
literature on individual earnings processes. We suggest that the combination of on-the-job search
and renegotiation by mutual agreement is a very promising candidate explanation of the widely
documented persistence of earnings shocks. In particular, our structural approach highlights the
interplay between job mobility and earnings dynamics: the model predicts that the individual
probabilities of transitions between labor market states condition the individual earnings process
in a way that is consistent with the data. More generally, our theory suggests that the income
process should be thought of as following a particular acceptance/rejection scheme of underlying
i.i.d. productivity shocks, of which labor market transition rates are a key determinant.
We further show that fitting the typical ARMA process described above both to the real world
data and to our simulated data yields very similar decompositions of the earnings process, which
are both in line with the recurring findings of the literature. Interestingly enough, we find evidence
of a random walk component in the income process on both real-world and model-generated data,
even though in the latter case income trajectories are known to be mean-reverting.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we pose the theoretical model.
In Section 3 we go on to derive the model’s solution in connection with our estimation procedure,
which is presented in Section 4, together with the data. Section 5 contains estimation results and
an analysis of the model’s performance at replicating some features of the earnings data. Finally,
we conclude and discuss a number of potentially interesting extensions in Section 6.
2 Theory
2.1 The environment
Basics. We consider a labor market where a unitary mass of workers face a continuum of identical
firms producing a multi-purpose good which they sell in a perfectly competitive market. Time is
discrete and the economy is at a steady state. Workers can either be unemployed or matched with
a firm. Firms operate constant-return technologies and are modeled as a collection of job slots
which can either be vacant and looking for a worker, or occupied and producing.
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The output flow yt of a firm-worker match in period t is defined as:
yt = p · εt. (1)
It is the product of a worker fixed-effect p and a transitory match- and period-specific shock εt.
We should emphasize that because the transitory shock is match-specific, a realization of εt is not
carried over from one firm to the other in case the worker changes firms within period t.
The population distribution of (log) worker fixed effects ln p is denoted as H (·). Identification
requires normalization of one of the components of (1). We choose to normalize the mean value of
ln p at zero: EH (ln p) = 0.
When a worker and a firm meet, the idiosyncratic component of (potential) match productivity
is drawn from a distribution M (·) with support [εmin, εmax]. Every ongoing firm-worker match
draws a new value of εt at the beginning of each period t from that same distribution M (·).
Depending on the realized value of εt, the match can go on under the same wage contract or under
a renegotiated contract. The precise cutoff values of the transitory shock under which a contract
is renegotiated are determined below. Finally, transitory shocks εt are uncorrelated over time or
across matches.
Future discounting. In general we assume that workers and firms are infinitely lived, forward-
looking, risk-neutral and have a common exogenous per-period discount factor of ρ. Yet in the
main text we shall work with a simple version of the model in which ρ = 0, i.e. workers and firms
are completely myopic and only care about current period flow revenues. The full model accounting
for forward-looking behavior (i.e. the model with ρ > 0) is presented in detail in Appendix A.
At this point we would like to insist that the assumption ρ = 0 is made merely to simplify
the exposition of the theoretical model in the main text. Indeed the form of the empirical model
derived from our theory is independent of the value of ρ, so that the analysis from section 3 onward
is applicable irrespective of that value. More specifically, we show in Appendix A that ρ only affects
the way in which productivity shocks translate into wage shocks. As our estimation procedure is
based on wage data only (and on the assumption that productivity shocks are i.i.d.), knowledge of
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ρ is unnecessary for the identification of the parameters of our wage process. It would only matter
if we wanted to recover the distribution of productivity shocks implied by our model and by the
earnings dynamics observed in our data.
Unemployment income. In any given period, an unemployed worker with permanent produc-
tivity component p (henceforth a “type-p worker”) receives a flow income of b · p, b > 0. This
contains the assumption that unemployment income depends on the permanent individual produc-
tivity parameter in the same way (i.e. multiplicatively) as productivity in a match with a firm.
This assumption is inessential—although not quantitatively innocuous—and again is merely made
because it simplifies the formal model somewhat. A more important implicit assumption made here
is that, while unemployment income may differ between workers, it does not fluctuate over time.
Surpluses. Consider a match between a firm and a type-p worker, with current productivity ε.
Denote the current wage in this match by φ.5 Under our current simplifying assumption of infinite
future discounting, the worker’s valuation of this match net of the foregone unemployment income
is φ − b · p. Further assuming that a vacant job slot is worth 0 to the firm (as naturally results
from free entry and exit of vacant jobs on the search market), the firm’s net valuation of that same
match equals p · ε− φ. Accordingly, the total surplus accruing from the match is the sum of those
two valuations and simply equals p · (ε− b). An important thing to note about total match surplus
is that it is independent of any wage value.
Job search, match formation and match dissolution. One core assumption in this paper is
that the labor market is affected by job search frictions: firms and workers are brought together in
pairs through random search. Specifically, any unemployed worker has a per-period probability λ0
of meeting a firm. We also allow employed workers to raise job offers and assume that they have
a per-period probability λ1 of meeting a potential alternative employer. Note that we only allow
workers (in any employment state) to contact at most one firm per period. Moreover, we assume
that contacts made in earlier periods cannot be recalled.
5For the sake of notational lightness, we shall omit period subscripts t when they are not strictly necessary.
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Not all firm-worker contacts are a priori conducive to an actual job move: for employed job
seekers, the decision of whether or not to quit an ongoing match for a new one involves a comparison
of match surpluses which will be carried out in full detail in the next subsection.
Finally, all matches have a common, exogenous breakup probability of δ per period. This
assumption calls for the following comments. The formation or continuation of any firm-worker
match implies the minimal requirement that total match surplus be nonnegative. Strictly abiding
by the simple specifications detailed above, total match surplus equals p ·(ε− b). Thus what we are
assuming here is simply εmin ≥ b, i.e. we are only truncating the “true” underlying distribution of
productivity shocks from below at b.6 However an alternative, probably more general view on the
essence of the assumption of an exogenous job destruction rate is that transitory shocks to match
quality—that potentially cause individual income fluctuations—are of a fundamentally different
nature than shocks leading to a job loss. While our formal setup clearly takes it that shocks to ε
are match-specific, we do not give any specific interpretation of the random event causing match
destruction, which can reflect adverse shocks to any combination of the match, the individual, the
market or the firm.
2.2 Wage determination
General principles. The central principle we stick to is that renegotiation only occurs by mutual
consent in continuing matches.7 In other words, no firm or worker can force their match partner to
renegotiate the terms of the employment relationship against the latter’s interest, unless the former
has a credible threat to leave the match.
The implications for wage dynamics of renegotiation by mutual consent were analyzed theo-
retically by MacLeod and Malcomson (1993).8 These implications, of which we gave an informal
6More precisely, assume that there is an underlying latent sampling distribution of potential match qualities, say
M0 (·), with support (−∞, εmax). Then, any draw of a productivity shock above b yields a positive potential match
surplus, while any draw falling short of b entails a negative potential match surplus and causes match dissolution.
Hence the match destruction rate δ can be seen as equalingM0 (b), whileM (·) simply coincides withM0 (·) truncated
below at b.
7See Malcomson (1997, 1999) for a motivation of this principle.
8The general framework used by MacLeod and Malcomson (1993) is similar to the one we use in this paper,
even though their main focus is on the design of efficient contracts when specific investments undertaken by either
contracting party are potentially subject to hold-up from the rival party. Such specific investments are not explicitly
present in our model.
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account in Figure 1 in the introduction, can be summarized as follows. If one party does have a
credible threat to dissolve the match, i.e. if the value of her/his outside option exceeds the value
s/he gets from the existing relationship, the other party will consent to wage renegotiation up (or
down) to the point where this outside option is matched.9 The existing match will only survive
if the surplus it generates is greater than the sum of surpluses generated by the outside options
(i.e. a vacant job and an alternative worker-firm match or an unemployed worker). In case neither
party has a credible threat to leave the match, there is no mutual consent to renegotiate and the
current terms of employment continue to apply—i.e. there is no wage renegotiation.
In newly created matches, there are no pre-existing terms of the (potential) employment rela-
tionship and a start-up wage has to be determined. Here we follow the approach of Postel-Vinay
and Robin (2002a,b) and assume that firms make take-it-or-leave-it offers to the workers, so start-
ing wages with new employers give workers the value of their outside option.10 The latter equals
b · p for a worker hired from unemployment or the maximum value the worker could extract from
her/his previous employer if the new match follows a job-to-job quit. Thus in the latter case, as
explained in Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002a,b), we effectively let the incumbent and the outside
employer Bertrand-compete for the worker’s services.
Negotiation baselines. It is useful to introduce at this stage the following convention for the
description of all wages. As will shortly become clear, at any time, the wage that the worker receives,
φ, can be expressed as a the product of her/his type p and a value of match-specific productivity
level r (which will not necessarily be equal to match-specific productivity in the current match, ε).
9That is, when renegotiation occurs, outside options act as bounds on the players’ payoffs. This is known in the
bargaining literature as the outside option principle. (See e.g. Sutton, 1986, or Binmore, Shaked and Sutton, 1988).
10That is, in terms of a Nash bargaining approach, we assume that the worker has zero bargaining power in newly
formed matches. Extending the model to allow for positive worker bargaining power is of potential quantitative
importance (see Dey and Flinn, 2005, and Cahuc, Postel-Vinay and Robin, 2004), yet it complicates the writing of
the model somewhat. We leave this extension for later work.
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More precisely, all wages will take the form:
φ = φ (r, p) = b · p︸︷︷︸
Unemp-
loyment
value
+ p · (r − b)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Match surplus
given produc-
tivity r
, (2)
where r gives a measure of the surplus that the worker enjoys over and above the value of being
unemployed, b · p. Note that ε ≥ r ≥ b necessarily holds, otherwise either the firm would earn
negative profits and fire the worker or the worker would find it preferable to quit into unemployment.
Again for reasons that will become clear shortly, we will term r the worker’s negotiation baseline.
In the next three paragraphs, we define the negotiation baseline formally.
Starting wages. First consider an unemployed, type-p worker meeting a job-advertising firm.
Given the assumptions just discussed and a current match quality of ε, the potential match yields
positive surplus, and a starting wage contract must be signed. As mentioned above, we assume
that, in a newly created match, the employer extracts all the match rent by offering the worker
her/his reservation value. In this simple context of infinite time discounting, this entails a starting
wage equal to b · p, and a negotiation baseline of b.
Outside offers. We now examine the situation which arises when an already employed worker
with current match productivity p · ε and current negotiation baseline r meets another potential
employer through on-the-job search. We denote the match-specific component of productivity in
the poaching firm as η.
Consistently with the assumptions listed above, we let the incumbent employer and the “poacher”
Bertrand-compete for the worker’s services. The worker extract the whole surplus form the less pro-
ductive of the two potential matches, which translates into a new negotiation baseline of min {ε, η}.
If ε < η, the poacher profitably attracts the worker with a wage offer of p · ε (plus one cent)—an
offer that the incumbent employer is unable to match without incurring losses. Alternatively, if
ε ≥ η, then the incumbent can profitably retain the worker by matching the poacher’s maximal
wage offer of p · η. Here as a result of the outside offer, the worker stays in her/his current job but
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can force wage renegotiation up to her/his new outside option, p · η. In this latter case, however,
renegotiation only takes place if the worker gains from it, i.e. if η ≥ r (otherwise we assume that
the worker always has the option to conceal the outside offer s/he has received from the poacher).
We can summarize the possible outcomes of an outside offer received by the worker as follows:


η > ε Worker quits, mobility wage p · ε, new negotiation baseline ε,
ε > η > r Worker stays, renegotiated wage p · η, new negotiation baseline η,
r > η Offer is discarded, nothing changes.
Productivity shocks. A last potential cause of wage renegotiation is the occurrence of a pro-
ductivity shock. Again consider a match with productivity p · ε, and current negotiation baseline
r, and assume a new transitory shock value of ε′ is drawn. One of three situations can arise.11
A first, simple case is ε′ ≥ ε. In this case, the worker would like to renegotiate in order to
capture some of the extra surplus brought by the gain in match productivity. But the worker’s
only outside option is to resign and become unemployed, thus achieving a value of p · b, equivalent
to a negotiation baseline of b. This is never preferable to keeping the existing contract which
negotiation baseline of r ≥ b. In other words, the worker cannot force the firm to renegotiate. As
a consequence, the productivity gain causes no wage renegotiation and the match goes on with an
unchanged wage.
In the second case, ε > ε′ ≥ r, the match has undergone a loss of productivity and the firm’s
profit has decreased from p · (ε− r) to p · (ε′ − r). The firm would thus want to share some of this
loss with the worker by lowering the wage. But as long as ε′ ≥ r, profits remain positive at the
current wage p · r. At that point the firm’s only outside option is to fire the worker, thus ending
up with a vacant job worth 0, while going on with the existing contract still gives it a positive
profit. Hence the firm cannot force the worker to renegotiate, and the match again goes on with
an unchanged wage.
The third, more complicated case is when r > ε′ ≥ εmin. In this case, since ε
′ ≥ εmin, and
11For simplicity of exposition, we describe here the case where no outside offers are raised by the worker. The
fact that productivity shocks and outside offers can occur simultaneously will of course be taken into account in the
following sections.
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since by assumption εmin ≥ b, the match is still viable, meaning that a mutually beneficial contract
exists. However, keeping the existing wage p · r would imply a negative profit flow of p · (ε′ − r).
Here the firm is better off firing the worker than maintaining the match under the existing contract,
and so has a credible threat which it can use to force the worker into renegotiation. Our assumed
wage-setting rules then imply a wage cut down to the point where the firm enjoys in the continuing
match the same value as in its outside option, here equal to zero with a vacant job. This leaves the
worker with a wage value of p · ε′ in the continuing match. Her/his negotiation baseline has thus
been updated to ε′.
2.3 Within-period timing of events
The last thing that requires further specification before we can solve the model is the sequence of
random events affecting firm-worker matches events within each period. We simply assume that all
of these random events are realized simultaneously at the beginning of each period. The list of such
events is the following: match destruction shocks (with probability δ, any given match is dissolved),
firm-worker contacts (any unemployed worker meets a potential employer with probability λ0, and
any employed worker meets a potential alternative employer with probability λ1), and draws of
transitory match productivity shocks ε in incumbent and potential matches. We assume that job
destruction shocks and outside offers cannot occur simultaneously, so that the probability that
neither occurs is 1− λ1 − δ. Then wage contracts are negotiated and signed for the period, wages
are paid and production takes place.
3 Model solution and econometric inference
Our aim is to estimate the model parameters with a standard panel of individual data on income
and labor force transitions (in this application a sub-sample of the BHPS). In this section, we thus
derive some of the model’s implications that are potentially useful for econometric inference.
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3.1 Worker turnover
First looking at job-to-job mobility, we have Pr {job-to-job move | ε} = λ1M (ε), implying that the
unconditional probability of a job-to-job mobility equals λ1/2.
12 Next turning to transitions in and
out of employment, the probability of observing a worker moving from employment into unemploy-
ment is δ, independently of the worker’s type p or the particular value of ε in the worker’s initial
match. In the opposite direction, the unemployment exit rate is λ0 for all workers. Incidentally, this
implies a steady-state unemployment rate of u = δ
δ+λ0
, obtained from the flow-balance condition
ensuring the constancy of the unemployment rate: λ0u = δ (1− u). This latter condition will be
used at various points below.
Most importantly, we see that all the transition probabilities can be retrieved by maximization
of the likelihood of observed job and unemployment spell durations.13
3.2 Wage distributions
The model laid out in section 2 implies that all wages have a multiplicative form φ (r, p) = p · r.
It thus predicts that log-wages are additively separable into a worker fixed effect ln p and a transi-
tory/persistent match-specific component v = ln r, the dynamics of which will be characterized in
the next subsection.
Conditional on p, log-wages are thus distributed as v. Focusing on steady-state cross-sectional
distributions for now, we seek to determine the steady-state population distribution of v, G (v).
Let us consider flows in and out of the stock (1− u)G (v) of employed workers with a (log) nego-
tiation baseline less than v = ln r. Workers exit this pool either if their match has been dissolved
(probability δ) or if their new negotiation baseline is greater than r (probability λ1M (r)
2).14 Two
flows of workers enter this pool: λ0u previously unemployed workers, and employed workers with
a previous negotiation baseline greater than r with probability (1− δ)M (r).15
12Throughout this paper, a bar over a cdf will be used to denote the survivor function.
13The hazard rates of job destruction, job finding and job-to-job move are thus constant with respect to spell
duration. This counterfactual prediction could be improved upon by introducing some worker heterogeneity in these
transition probabilities. We discuss this possible extension in Section 6.
14As observing an increase in the negotiation baseline requires the worker to receive an outside offer and the
productivities of both the poaching and the incumbent firms to be above the current negotiation baseline.
15As, conditional on remaining employed, workers will have a new negotiation baseline lower than r if the idiosyn-
13
We can thus now write the balance of flows in and out of the stock (1− u)G (v). Denoting as
F (·) the sampling distribution of log-productivity shocks, so that F (ln r) =M (r), we have:
(1− u)G (v) =
(
1− δ − λ1F (v)
2
)
· (1− u)G (v) + (1− δ)F (v) · (1− u)G (v) + λ0 · u
⇐⇒ G (v) =
1− (1− δ)F (v)
1− (1− δ)F (v) + λ1F (v)
2 . (3)
Note the existence of a mass at v0 = ln b, G (v0) =
δ
δ+λ1
due to the unemployed workers all being
hired at the minimum negotiation negotiation baseline v0. More precisely, we can decompose G (·)
as:
G (v) =
δ
δ + λ1
· 1{v≥v0} +
[
1− (1− δ)F (v)
1− (1− δ)F (v) + λ1F (v)
2 −
δ
δ + λ1
]
· 1{v≥vmin}, (4)
where vmin = ln εmin is the lower support of F (·). Also, as expected, G (·) is identically equal to 1
in the absence of on-the-job search (i.e. if λ1 = 0).
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3.3 Wage dynamics
Wage dynamics are driven by the combination of two distinct forces: job offers and idiosyncratic
shocks to match productivity. Given knowledge of the process governing the arrival of job offers
(i.e. given knowledge of the arrival rate λ1, which we saw is identified from job spell durations and
job transitions), observed individual wage dynamics thus potentially convey information about the
distribution of match productivity shocks. This is the idea that we pursue in this subsection.
Dynamics over one period. At any period t, an employed worker earns a wage φt such that
lnφt = ln p+vt, and we are left to analyze the dynamics of vt = ln rt, the log of the worker’s current
negotiation baseline rt.
cratic shock of their incumbent firm is drawn lower than r, whether they raise an outside offer or not.
16Incidentally we may emphasize that, contrary to standard job search models without idiosyncratic productivity
shocks, our model features a non-degenerate equilibrium wage distribution even if one assumes away any risk of
unemployment (i.e. if δ = 0). Absent productivity shocks, continuously employed workers would gradually climb up
the wage ladder as they receive outside job offers (at a speed that depends on the particular assumptions on wage
determination. See Burdett and Mortensen (1998) for the canonical wage-posting model, Postel-Vinay and Robin
(2002a) for an offer-matching model closer to the one of this paper, Burdett and Coles (2003) for a model of explicit
wage-tenure contracts, and finally Mortensen (2003) for an overview.) Job loss then acts as a “reset button” for
this process of wage progression, as workers who have experienced a spell of unemployment essentially have to start
over at the bottom of the wage ladder (e.g. in our model, they start over with a negotiation baseline of v0). In the
standard model, without this reset button, all workers would end up at the top of the wage distribution and only
one wage (equal to marginal productivity) would be observed in the long-run equilibrium of a homogeneous labor
market. Here we see that, by causing occasional wage cuts, productivity shocks prevent this from happening.
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When period t+1 begins, with probability δ the match is hit by a dissolution shock. In this case
the worker becomes unemployed and her/his income flow becomes equal to p · b. With probability
1−δ, the worker stays employed and her/his continuation wage depends on the new value of her/his
negotiation baseline r′. We thus now examine the value of r′ in the various possible cases.
If the match continues, but the worker fails to find any outside job opportunity (probability
1 − δ − λ1), the only source of randomness is the realization of εt+1. Our various assumptions
concerning the wage setting rules then imply the following. If εmin ≤ εt+1 < rt, then the match is
maintained but under a renegotiated contract and the new negotiation baseline is εt+1. Otherwise,
if εt+1 ≥ rt, then none of the parties can force the other to renegotiate and the match goes on
under an unchanged contract, leaving both negotiation baseline and wage unchanged.
Next consider the situation in which match continues and the worker manages to contact a
poacher (probability λ1). The idiosyncratic productivity component ηt+1 of a potential match with
the poacher is drawn at random from F (·). We scan over all possible values of the shocks εt+1 and
ηt+1 and see what happens in each case.
First, if εmin ≤ εt+1 < rt then the worker has a choice between playing off the two firms against
each other or simply discarding the poacher’s offer. The former option will yield the worker a new
negotiation baseline of min {εt+1, ηt+1}, and the latter a negotiation baseline of εt+1. One thus sees
that the worker’s optimal choice yields a continuation value of the negotiation baseline of εt+1.
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Second, if εt+1 ≥ rt, then playing off the two employers against each other again yields a new
negotiation baseline of min {εt+1, ηt+1}, while ignoring the poacher’s offer amounts to continuing
a relationship with the incumbent employer under unchanged terms, thus keeping a negotiation
baseline at rt and consequently an unchanged wage. It follows that the worker’s optimal choice
yields a continuation renegotiation baseline equal to max〈rt,min {ηt+1, εt+1}〉.
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Summarizing the above, the conditional distribution of the continuing (log) negotiation baseline
17The optimal choice is to let the firms compete whenever ηt+1 > εt+1. The outcome of the Bertrand game thus
triggered is that the worker joins the poaching firm.
18The optimal choice is to let the firms compete whenever ηt+1 > rt. The outcome of the Bertrand game is then
that the worker joins the poaching firm if ηt+1 > εt+1, and obtains a wage raise from her/his incumbent employer if
εt+1 ≥ ηt+1 > rt.
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vt+1 | vt is as follows:
vt+1 | vt =


vt with probability (1− δ)F (vt)− λ1F (vt)
2 ,
v′ < vt with density (1− δ) f (v
′) ,
v′ > vt with density 2λ1f (v
′)F (v′) ,
(5)
whereas with probability δ the worker becomes unemployed and vt+1 is irrelevant.
Conditional on individual fixed-effects p, we thus predict that wages follow a first-order, nonlin-
ear Markovian process based on a specific acceptance/rejection scheme of i.i.d. wage innovations.19
We also predict that the rates of transition between labor market states (δ and λ1) are key determi-
nants of the individual earnings process. This strong prediction of our structural model highlights
the interplay between job mobility and income dynamics: job mobility reflects the intensity of labor
market competition between employers (as measured by the frequency at which employed workers
raise outside job offers), which in turn conditions the observed (dynamic) behavior of wages. If
validated empirically, that prediction may help with the interpretation of observed wage dynamics.
The empirical properties of the process in (5)—and its differences with the conventional linear
ARMA specification—will be analyzed in a later section. For the time being, we derive the fol-
lowing moment which will be useful for estimation. Integration of (5) implies that, conditional on
employment at two consecutive dates t and t+ 1:
E (vt+1 | vt, employment at t, t+ 1)=EF (v)−
∫ vmax
vt
(
F (x)−
λ1
1− δ
F (x)2
)
dx (6)
= vt +
λ1
1− δ
∫ vmax
vt
F (x)2 dx−
∫ vt
vmin
F (x) dx.
This latter equation shows that conditional expected wage growth—i.e. E (vt+1 − vt | vt, employ-
ment at t, t+ 1)—is the sum of a positive term reflecting the impact of outside job offers causing
wage increases, and a negative term coming from adverse productivity shocks causing downward
wage renegotiation. As intuition suggests, the former dominates among workers with a relatively
19Incidentally, our specific model is not the only one suggesting that this type of acceptance/rejection scheme is the
right way to think about wage dynamics. The process in (5) is indeed formally reminiscent of predictions obtained
by Harris and Holmstro¨m (1982) and Thomas and Worral (1988) in models of self-enforcing wage contracts designed
to allocate risk between a risk-neutral employer and a risk-averse employee faced with uncertainty about match
productivity and/or market opportunities. (Much of the related theoretical literature on labor market contracts
indeed emphasizes risk sharing as the main driving force behind individual income dynamics—see Malcomson, 1999,
for a comprehensive review.)
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low current negotiation baseline vt (which translates into a relatively low wage conditional on their
type p), while the latter dominates for workers with a high current negotiation baseline (which has
little chance to be exceeded by the minimum of a pair of random draws from F (·)).20
Dynamics over s periods. We now consider the distribution vt+s conditional on employment
at dates t, · · · , t+ s, i.e. the distribution of negotiation baselines conditional on at least s periods
of continuous employment. Designating the cdf of this distribution by Gs (·), we show the following
in Appendix B:
Gs (v) =
[
1−
(
F (v)−
λ1
1− δ
F (v)2
)s]
·G∞ (v) +
(
F (v)−
λ1
1− δ
F (v)2
)s
·G (v) , (7)
where
G∞ (v) =
F (v)
1− F (v) + λ11−δF (v)
2 .
Hence as one conditions on more periods of continuous employment, the cross-sectional distribu-
tion of negotiation baselines gradually shifts from G (v) to G∞ (v). A particular property of this
shift (see Appendix B) is that it features a monotonically increasing mean, i.e. EGs (v) increases
with s. Hence, from a cross-section perspective, our model predicts positive returns to continuous
employment in that the mean negotiation baseline increases with the duration of continuous em-
ployment. At the point of hire from unemployment, workers all start out with a negotiation baseline
of v0 = ln (b). From there, any outside offer will lead to a wage increase and a new negotiation
baseline while productivity shocks cannot lead to wage decreases as εmin ≥ b.
21 As one looks at
populations that have been continuously employed for longer periods, the fraction of individuals
having not yet received their first outside offer since they got out of unemployment (and hence the
fraction of individuals with a low negotiation baseline of v0) gradually shrinks. This selection effect
is the driving force behind the increase in the mean wage with s.
Based on the definition (7), we can then compute any set of model-predicted moments to use
20Note that, beyond means, higher-order moments of the conditional distribution of vt+1 | vt are functions of vt.
This leaves scope for ARCH-type effects, as were detected in US data by Meghir and Pistaferri (2004).
21The negotiation baseline resulting from the first outside offer after an unemployment spell is a draw from 1−F (·)2,
i.e. the distribution of the minimum of two draws from F (·).
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in the estimation. In practice, as we discuss in the next subsection, we shall use all first- and
second-order moments of Gs (·).
The earnings autocovariance structure also conveys potentially useful information about earn-
ings dynamics. We establish in Appendix B that:22
Cov (lnφt, lnφt+s) = VarH (ln p)− CovG
(
vt,
∫ vmax
vt
(
F (x)−
λ1
1− δ
F (x)2
)s
dx
)
. (8)
(Subscripts indicate the distribution with respect to which expectations are taken.) Again these
autocovariances are the sum of a constant term (the population variance of the fixed-effect ln p),
and a term that decreases down to zero as s goes to infinity. This reflects the limited persistence
of wage shocks in our model: the memory of the initial negotiation baseline vt gradually fades out
as workers are hit by productivity shocks and/or outside offers causing renegotiation.
A panel length of T (i.e. T different dates at which we observe a cross-section of individual
wages) thus provides us with 3T − 1 moment conditions (T means and T variances from (7) and
T − 1 covariances from (8)) on which to base an estimation of the F (·) distribution.
4 Data and estimation procedure
Structure of the analysis sample. We use a sub-sample of the British Household Panel Survey
(BHPS). The BHPS is a 12-wave (1991 to 2002) panel of household data, of which we use waves 2
to 12, thus following individuals for up to 11 years.23 The BHPS gives information on individual
labor market spell histories and precise spell durations (down to the month or the day when not
missing), together with records of individual earnings and working hours every 12 months.
There is some attrition from- and entry into the panel, both of which we assume exogenous.
We also drop the few individuals that have gaps in their records.
Our working sample is obtained from the following selection of the raw data. We use data on
males and females aged 25 to 60. We restrict our analysis to individuals with A-level education
or more, both for the sake of brevity and also because the individual-level wage-bargaining/offer-
22We continue to work conditionally on continuous employment between dates t and t + s. However, to avoid a
notational overload, we now keep this conditioning implicit.
23We discard wave 1 (1991) because of substantial coding differences between this and the subsequent waves.
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matching process described in the theoretical model is arguably more relevant in high-skill labor
markets. For similar reasons, we do not consider individuals observed as self-employed or employed
in the public sector in their initial year in the survey.24
Based on these selection rules, we then construct two separate samples. The first one draws
from records of individual labor market spell histories and will serve for the estimation of transition
parameters: we take all selected individuals at their first interview date, follow them throughout
the 11 waves and record all their labor market spell durations and transition types (job-to-job or
job-to-unemployment).
Our second sample is an income sample gathering the yearly observations of wages and working
hours: we compute hourly wages using data on (before-tax) labor income received in the last
month and on worked hours. We then regress these wages on indicators of year, education, gender,
ethnic background and labor market cohort. We use the residuals from this latter regression as our
measure of individual earnings. We finally trim the data by dropping the top and bottom 2.5% of
earnings (residuals). This trimming is useful to stabilize our empirical estimates of cross-sectional
wage variances.
< Table 1 about here. >
Our job spell sample comprises 614 initially employed individuals and 44 initially unemployed
individuals, while our income sample comprises 646 individuals with a valid initial wage observation.
Table 1 gives more detailed descriptive statistics for the two samples.
Estimation procedure. Following the above developments, we carry out a two-step estimation
procedure. In the first step we use the data on labor market spells to estimate the transition rates δ
and λ1 using maximum likelihood on observed job spell durations and job transitions. In the second
step, we use our income data to estimate the remaining parameters—i.e. the sampling distribution
F (·) of productivity shocks and the distribution of person fixed-effects H (·)—by matching a series
of wage means and covariances, as derived in subsection 3.3. Specifically, we match the following
24Ideally, we would have liked to work on a more homogeneous set of workers. Yet as we shall see below, given
the resulting sample size, this is probably the finest stratification of the original BHPS data that we can reasonably
envisage.
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3T − 1 moments (where T is the panel length in years), for s = 0, 12, 24, · · · , 12 (T − 1):25
E (lnφt+s) = EGs (v)
Var (lnφt+s) = VarH (ln p) + VarGs (v) + σ
2
me
Cov (lnφt, lnφt+s) = VarH (ln p)− CovG
(
vt,
∫ vmax
vt
(
F (x)−
λ1
1− δ
F (x)2
)s
dx
)
. (9)
All these means and covariances are conditional on continuous employment between times t and
t + s.26 Also, we set our period length to be one month, hence the series of leads being taken
at multiples of 12 periods to match our yearly wage data. Finally note in the second line of (9)
the addition of a term σ2me to the theoretical expression of cross-sectional income variances. This
accounts for the presence of classical measurement error (with variance σ2me) in hourly wages.
We match these moments using Optimal Minimum Distance (OMD) estimation.
For convenience, we choose to parameterize the population distribution of productivity shocks,
G (·) rather than the sampling distribution F (·). The latter can then easily be retrieved from G (·)
using equation (3). As detailed in equation (4) in the theoretical section, G (·) is the sum of a
mass point at v0 corresponding to entry wages for previously unemployed workers who all start
off their employment spell with a negotiation baseline of v0, and a transformation of the sampling
distribution F (·) with lower support vmin. We thus parameterize G (·) as the sum of a mass point
(at v0) and a normal distribution, truncated below at vmin. Note that because match surpluses are
nonnegative for any realization of the productivity shock, it has to be the case that vmin ≥ v0. In
fact we assume vmin = v0. This assumption seems natural in that it means that jobs and job offers
exist for values of the productivity shock down to a value leading to a match surplus of zero (see
the discussion in footnote 6).
As to the distribution of worker fixed effects H (·), we see that only its variance, VarH (ln p)
appears in the series of moments we aim to match—see (9). The distribution H (·) can however
25The first T moments (mean wages) use the normalization E (ln p) = 0.
26This conditioning leads us to discard the information brought by observations for individuals who experienced
a complete unemployment spell between t and t + s, and still have a wage record at both dates. It is possible to
write down the means and autocovariances in (9) conditional on employment at t and t + s only. However, the
corresponding formulae are cumbersome and unemployment is a sufficiently rare event in our sample to make the
loss of information entailed in the more stringent conditioning inconsequential.
20
be retrieved from our estimate of G (·) and the actual wage distribution by deconvolution. Yet as
we shall see below, knowledge of this estimated variance will be sufficient for all of our simulation
exercises.
5 Results
5.1 Parameter estimates
Transition rates. The estimated arrival rates of outside offers and job destruction shocks are
reported in Table 2, in monthly values. The probability of receiving an outside offer is about
1.6 percent per month. Because the probability of job switching is equal to λ1/2 (see subsection
3.1), this number says that a little under one in a hundred employed workers from our high-skill
sample switch jobs each month. With a job destruction rate of just under a third of one percent
(implying an average waiting time of about 25 years between two spells of unemployment), the
average duration of a job spell, (δ + λ1/2)
−1, is in the order of 7.5 years.
< Table 2 about here. >
Finally turning to the unemployment exit rate λ0, we estimate it at 4.55 percent monthly
implying a mean unemployment duration of just under two years. Combined with the estimated
value of δ, it also implies an unemployment rate of 6.7%. Considering that we have a sample of
highly educated workers, this may sound like a long duration and a high rate. These numbers,
however, replicate the contents of the data.27
Distributions. Table 3 contains the OMD estimates and standard errors of the various distribu-
tional parameters involved in our moment conditions (9).28 A graphical rendering of the resulting
distributions F (·) and G (·) is provided in the bottom-right panel of Figure 2 below.
< Table 3 about here. >
27It seems notorious that unemployment appears to be highly persistent in the BHPS data (Stewart, 2004). Also,
the mean unemployment duration implied by our estimated value of λ0 may seem at odds with the mean duration
of unemployment spells reported in Table 1. We should bear in mind that our estimated λ0 aims to fit both spell
durations and the initial (un)employment rate observed in our sample.
28The reported standard errors do not account for the presence of the nuisance parameters δ and λ1, which appear
in the theoretical moments and which we fix to their estimated value from our first estimation step. Hence the
standard errors reported in Table 3 are likely slightly understated.
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The first thing we notice from the first row of Table 3 is the relatively poor precision of our
estimate of σ2me, the variance of the measurement error. Based on this sample we cannot reject
that it is equal to zero (p-value of 0.097 against the alternative σ2me = 0.011, our point estimate).
Hence in the bottom row of Table 3 we also report parameter estimates obtained subject to the
constraint σ2me = 0. Comparison of the two rows shows that the only parameter on which these
constraints have any impact at all is σ—the standard deviation of G (·), the population distribution
of negotiation baselines, as explained in section 4—, which is estimated slightly higher in the absence
of measurement error. Yet even this latter difference is virtually undetectable in our simulation
exercises (see below).
The minimum negotiation baseline, v0 = vmin that workers start off with when first hired from
unemployment is estimated at 1.74, to be compared with a value of the mean negotiation baseline
(which equals the mean log wage residual under our normalization EH (ln p) = 0) over all employed
workers of 2.20. Recall that G (v) is parameterized as the sum of a mass of δ
δ+λ1
at v0 and a normal
distribution of mean µ and variance σ2 truncated at vmin. Given our estimated transition rates δ
and λ1, we estimate the fraction of employed workers with a minimum negotiation baseline to be
17%.
The variance of the worker fixed-effect distribution, VarH (ln p), is 0.06. Taking the variance of
the measurement error to equal 0.01, this suggests that the relative contributions of the permanent
component of earnings ln p, the transitory component of earnings vt, and measurement error to the
total cross-sectional earnings variance (which equals 0.15) are 40% for ln p, about 53.5% for vt, and
6.5% for the measurement error (this latter number being little more than indicative, given the
lack of precision with which we estimate σ2me).
Finally, as we use 11 years of data, (9) corresponds to a set of 3T −1 = 32 moments to match in
the estimation, for only 5 parameters to estimate. Table 3 reports the test statistic and p-value of a
Wald test of overidentifying restrictions. With a p-value of 0.83, the model passes this specification
test.
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5.2 Simulations and fit analysis
Matched moments. Figure 2 displays the moments listed in (9) that we match in the estimation,
as they are predicted by our model with the estimated parameters and as they are observed in our
sample. In all panels the dotted lines materialize 95% confidence bands around the empirical
moments.
< Figure 2 about here. >
The top left panel shows the progression of the mean log-wage as one conditions on zero to 12T
months of continuous employment. In the data, this mean log-wage increases from 2.22 for the whole
employed population to 2.31 for the subset of workers with a duration of continuous employment of
11 years or more.29 This wage growth is well replicated—if slightly underestimated—by our model.
The top right panel shows the evolution of the variance of the distribution of log-earnings
conditional on zero to 12T months of continuous employment. We showed above that the underlying
conditional distribution, Gs (·), gradually shifts from the steady-state population distribution G (·)
when we condition on a minimum length of continuous employment of zero periods, toG∞ (·) when s
is increased indefinitely. The predicted variance ofGs (·) clearly declines with the minimum duration
of uninterrupted employment, s. In spite of the poor precision of the empirical counterparts of these
conditional wage variances, the Figure is also suggestive of a decline of the latter with s, at least up
to s = 72 months (6 years). While staying well within the confidence bands, the model still seems
to have a tendency to over-predict this decline at long lags. Yet at this level of precision, we may
say that the empirical pattern is consistent with the model.
Finally, the bottom-left panel graphs wage autocovariances at 0 to 12T lags (again conditional
on continuous employment over the number of lags considered). As expected, these autocovariances
decline as one looks at longer lags, in a way that the model captures well. Note in particular the
convergence of Cov (lnφt, lnφt+s) toward Var (ln p) as the number of lags increases.
29These individuals account for 37.5% of our sample.
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Wage changes. Using the parameter estimates obtained above, we can now create a sample of
simulated data which can then be compared to the real data along any dimension we like. This
will allow us to assess the model’s capacity to replicate features of the data that were not directly
matched in the estimation. In the reported simulations we alternatively use the values of σ2me = 0
and σ2me = 0.01 for the variance of the measurement error.
30
An intuitive way of looking at earnings dynamics beyond first- and second-order moments
(which, as we just saw, the model replicates well enough) is to consider the distribution of wage
changes from one year to another. In the language of our theory, this is the distribution of vt+s−vt,
with s some chosen horizon.
< Figure 3 about here. >
Figure 3 plots three such distributions of wage changes over one year (s = 12 months, left panel)
and ten years (s = 120 months, right panel). On both panels, the solid line is the empirical cdf
of log wage changes.31 The dashed line is the model-predicted counterpart of that cdf σ2me = 0.01.
Finally, the dash-dot line with a mass at zero is the cdf of simulated wage changes if one removes
measurement error from the model.
First comparing the “observed” and “predicted, with measurement error” distributions of yearly
wage changes (left panel), we observe a near perfect replication of the top half of the distribution
(i.e. the part of the distribution corresponding to wage increases) and a slightly larger discrepancy
in the bottom half, with the observed distribution tending to dominate the simulated one at the
first order. Next turning to the ten-year horizon graph (right panel), we get a somewhat more
distinct impression of first-order stochastic dominance, with the model overstating the median
earnings change over ten years by some 4.5 percentage points. While the overall look of the graph
is sensitive to the particular calibration of the measurement error, the robust conclusion is that the
model tends to slightly over-predict wage cuts, particularly large ones.
The model also predicts that many of the observed wage changes are in fact artificial and
30The construction of a sample of simulated data obviously requires additional distributional assumptions about
the person fixed-effect (ln p) and the measurement error, of which we only know the variance. We assume a normal
distribution for both (even though the distribution of ln p plays no part in the exercises to come).
31In the one-year-horizon case, all waves of our 1992-2002 analysis panel pooled. The ten-year-horizon graph
obviously has to rely on changes between the first and last waves only.
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only reflect measurement error: once measurement error is removed from the model, the predicted
distribution of year-to-year wage changes has a mass of about two thirds at zero. Interestingly,
the distribution without measurement error also seems more skewed than the observed one, as
the model-predicted share of “genuine” wage increases is roughly 12%, whereas the corresponding
figure for wage cuts is about a quarter. Finally note from the right panel of Figure 3 that the
predicted relative importance of measurement error in explaining the distibution of reported wage
changes becomes negligible as one looks at longer horizons.
Conditioning on job-to-job mobility. The model has very strong implications about earnings
dynamics around a job-to-job transition. As mentioned above, the date-t negotiation baseline of
a worker changing jobs at date t is equal to the date-t idiosyncratic match productivity shock at
the incumbent firm, which has to be less than productivity at the poaching firm if the worker
has switched from the former to the latter. In other words, conditional on observing a job-to-job
transition, the negotiation baseline is the minimum of two independent draws form F (·), hence a
draw from 1 − F (·)2. Most importantly, this new negotiation baseline vt is independent of any
previous negotiation baseline vt−s.
Are these predictions borne out by the data? A partial answer can be sought in the following
additional moment conditions, which are implied by the above considerations:32
E (lnφt | job-to-job transition at t) = E1−F 2 (v)
Var (lnφt | job-to-job transition at t) = VarH (ln p) + Var1−F 2 (v) + σ
2
me
Cov (lnφt, lnφt+s | job-to-job transition between t+ 1 and t+ s) = VarH (ln p) . (10)
Computation of the first two moments in (10) has to rely on independent wage observations that
32Of course these considerations imply much more than these moment restrictions. Indeed they even offer a potential
source of nonparametric identification of our model (up to the measurement error). Consider a worker experiencing a
job-to-job transition, for whom we have two wage observations, one on each side of the transition. Let lnφb = ln p+vb
denote the wage observed before the transition and lnφa = ln p+va the wage after the transition. From the above we
know that va is independent of vb. In principle we can thus retrieve H (·) and G (·) by nonparametric deconvolution—
and hence F (·) as well, using (3). (This is an application of a general identification theorem from Kotlarski, 1967.)
Unfortunately, implementation of this method requires a sufficient number of independent observations of a single
worker with a job-to-job mobility occurring between two valid wage observations. We only have in the order of 55
such observations in our sample.
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coincide with the occurrence of a job-to-job mobility, i.e. on the subset of single workers moving from
job to job in a month preceding an interview date. Because we only have one interview—therefore
at best one wage observation—each year, and because job-to-job transitions are infrequent events
altogether, we only have very few (indeed 25) such independent coincidences in our data set.33
This does not allow for a very precise estimation of the mean and variance of wages conditional
on mobility: the empirical mean is 2.25 (standard error of 0.08), and the empirical variance equals
0.16 (standard error of 0.05). Yet, the corresponding model predictions are 2.68 and 0.10. Hence,
while our prediction of the conditional variance is still acceptable (albeit on the low side), the model
seems to overstate the mean wage of job-to-job movers somewhat.
Computation of the series of conditional covariances in (10) can rely on a slightly wider set
of observations, as they only involve pairs of wage observations that are anywhere on either side
of a job-to-job mobility (as opposed to wage observations that exactly coincide with a job-to-job
mobility). Exploiting this, Figure 4 depicts the empirical covariance of wages at dates t = 1992
(the initial year) and t + s (for s = 0, 12, 24, · · · , 12 (T − 1) months) among workers who have
experienced at least one job-to-job transition between t + 1 and t + s. For comparison with the
model’s prediction, a horizontal line at VarH (ln p) is also drawn. Finally, at s = 0 the Figure reports
the observed and predicted conditional variance Var (φt | job-to-job transition at t). Dotted lines
represent confidence bands around the empirical moments.
< Figure 4 about here. >
Again given the scarce numbers of observations upon which we have to base our computations,34
this Figure only paints an indicative picture of the covariance profile of individual income around
a job-to-job transition. Yet it still suggests that this profile is both lower and markedly “flatter”
than the corresponding unconditional covariance profile plotted in the bottom-right panel of Figure
33The measurement of these “mobility” wages also runs into another problem, which is that the date at which a
job transition exactly occurs is certainly measured with error. For instance, some workers are known to report as
having started a new job spell, when they have really only accepted an offer for a job that is effectively to start at
some (near) future date. In these cases, it is unclear whether the reported wage pertains to the new or to the old job.
Because it likely adds some “pre-mobility” wages into our sample of mobility wages, this type of measurement error
tends to bias our empirical estimate of the conditional mean E (lnφt | job-to-job transition at t) downward, and that
of the corresponding variance upward.
34These numbers range from 21 to 60, depending on s.
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2. Both properties are in accordance with-, and indeed quantitatively well captured by the model.
Linear ARMA model. As we mentioned in the introduction, the literature has a long tradition
of fitting ARMA-type models to individual wage trajectories. In this paragraph we take another
look at the covariance structure of (observed and simulated) wages under this alternative angle.
The following describes a canonical ARMA specification found in the literature:

lnφi,t = zi + a
P
i,t + a
T
i,t,
aPi,t = a
P
i,t−1 + ζi,t, with ζi,t i.i.d.,
aTi,t =
q∑
ℓ=0
θℓ ξi,t−ℓ, with ξi,t i.i.d. and θ0 = 1.
(11)
Here log-earnings are modelled as the sum of an individual fixed-effect zi, a permanent earnings
shock aPi,t following a martingale process, and a transitory earnings shock a
T
i,t following an MA(q)
process. The order q of the latter MA process is to be determined empirically, along with the
parameters of this process (the θℓ’s) and the innovation variances, Var (ζi,t) and Var (ξi,t).
We fit model (11) separately to our income sample from the BHPS and to a sample of simulated
data based on the parameter estimates obtained above.35 We make the simulated sample of equal
size to the observed one. An important detail to keep in mind is that, for this paragraph, the time
unit is taken to be one year (as opposed to one month, as was the case thus far), in accordance
with the yearly frequency of wage observations in the BHPS data, so our simulated sample is made
up of yearly observations taken from a monthly simulated dataset.
The order of the MA process is determined by looking at the sequence of autocovariances of
first-differenced log wages, Cov (∆ lnφi,t,∆lnφi,t+s), which should equal zero for any s ≥ q+2. The
top panel of Table 4 reports these autocovariances at lags of up to 4 years for both the BHPS and
simulated sample. We first notice that the pattern of wage autocovariances is very similar in the real
and in the simulated data samples, which is expected given the good fit obtained with our model
with respect to these covariances (as illustrated in the bottom left panel of Figure 2). Second, the
magnitude of the covariance point estimates drops tenfold in both samples between the first and the
35We ignore the presence of measurement error in this comparative exercise. The measurement error variance
cannot be identified within the specification (11)—see Meghir and Pistaferri (2004).
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second lag and remains very small thereafter. Although a few higher-order autocovariances are still
statistically significant, both patterns square in well with earnings following an MA(1) process in
growth rates, thus implying that earnings levels can be described along the lines of model (11) as the
sum of a random walk component and a serially uncorrelated—or MA(0)—component. However,
for completeness we estimate model (11) under both the MA(0) and MA(1) specifications.36
Results for both samples and both specifications are displayed in the bottom panel of Table
4. Wald tests indicate that both specifications are marginally accepted based on either sample
at the 5% level (last column of the Table). Moreover, both samples lead to marginal rejection of
the MA(0) against the MA(1) specification (p-value of 0.023 and 0.018 for the true and simulated
samples, respectively). Now looking at the variances of innovations for the permanent and transitory
components of the earnings process—Var (ζi,t) and Var (ξi,t), respectively—, we observe again much
similarity between those obtained with the simulated sample and with the BHPS data. Most
intriguingly, as commonly found in the literature, we obtain a significant variance for the innovation
of the permanent earnings shock, thus concluding to the presence of a random walk component
of the individual earnings process, both in the real and in the simulated data. Yet we know that,
at least for the simulated data, the fitted ARMA process is misspecified and the true DGP is
stationary.37 This illustrates the difficulty of numerically distinguishing between a process truly
exhibiting a unit root and a highly persistent, possibly nonlinear Markov process (a category to
which the earnings process generated by our theoretical model belongs).
6 Conclusion
Our concern in this paper has been the ability of a simple structural model to replicate the main
features of the dynamics of individual labor earnings observed in the data. Our proposed model
belongs to the family of search models a` la Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides (DMP). Our specific
assumptions are that we allow on-the-job search and assume that wages can only be renegotiated
36Results from the literature conclude to the presence of either an MA(0) or an MA(1) component in the earnings
process, but not usually to higher order MA components. For the estimation, we proceed by OMD matching of the
autocovariance structure of yearly wage growth. Details are available on request.
37Indeed, according to our theoretical model, earnings have a steady-state distribution, G (·), with finite variance.
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with mutual consent by the firm and the worker. We investigate whether such a model can produce
a quantitatively plausible “internal propagation mechanism” of i.i.d. productivity shocks into per-
sistent wage shocks using a 10-year panel of highly educated British workers. Our key contributions
are the following.
First, we formalize the assumption of renegotiation by mutual consent in the context of a
job search model with idiosyncratic productivity shocks to match quality. We then scrutinize the
model outcomes in terms of individual earnings dynamics, whereas the existing job search literature
usually focuses on cross-sectional wage dispersion. Because the mutual consent rule will only allow
the wage level to be altered when one party has a credible threat to leave the match, wage dynamics
generated by our model are more persistent than under the constant-share Nash surplus sharing
rule often used for wage determination.
Second, we show that our model, when estimated with ten waves of BHPS data, produces
a dynamic earnings structure which is remarkably consistent with the data. The main features
of individual earnings dynamics, such as the covariance structure of earnings, the evolution of
individual earnings mean and variance with the duration of uninterrupted employment, or the
distribution of year-to-year earnings changes are very well matched by our model predictions.
Third, we offer a structural counterpart to the “reduced-form” literature on individual earnings
processes and we establish that the combination of on-the-job search and renegotiation by mutual
agreement is a very promising candidate explanation of the widely documented persistence of
earnings shocks. Our theory suggests that wage dynamics should be thought of as the outcome
of a specific acceptance/rejection scheme of i.i.d. wage shocks, thus offering an alternative to the
conventional linear ARMA-type approach. Moreover, it highlights the link between labor market
competition (as measured by the probability of raising outside job offers when employed), worker
mobility across jobs, and individual earnings dynamics.
There are several avenues for further work building on this paper. We now briefly discuss some
of these. A first, relatively straightforward extension would be to close our theoretical model in the
manner of the DMP framework to include the firm’s job creation decision. We could also allow for
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the job destruction to become endogenous by allowing the match surplus to be negative over some
of the support of the distribution of productivity shocks. Although such a closed model would be
difficult to estimate (it would be fraught with the well-known difficulty of estimating a matching
function), a calibrated version of it could still be used to analyze the impact of various labor
market policies. One could also simulate wage dynamics in response to business cycle shocks and
assess whether our model can reproduce the dampened cyclical fluctuations of wages (as compared
to fluctuations in productivity) observed in the data. Finally, this would allow us to relate our
model to well known empirical results of the contract literature, such as Beaudry’s and DiNardo’s
(1991) striking observation that individuals’ current wages are more strongly affected by the lowest
unemployment rate since the start of their job than by the current unemployment rate or the
unemployment rate at the start of the job.38
A second possible extension would be to incorporate the impact of human capital accumulation
into our model. While we have ignored it completely in the present paper, it obviously lines up as
a potential cause of the positive returns to continuous employment. A simple way of introducing
human capital into our framework would be to allow the individual-specific component of match
productivity to grow at a constant rate over time.39 Although this will make the derivations of the
predicted moments of interest much more cumbersome, it is likely to improve the fit of the model
in terms of the frequency and size of wage cuts, which the present model tends to overestimate.
A third avenue of potential improvement would be the addition of worker heterogeneity in the
transition rates, i.e. the hazards of job destruction, job finding and outside offers. This would help
with our model’s currently counterfactual implication that these three hazards are constant with
spell duration.
Finally, our model could be enriched by a more careful modelling of the employer side and a
more precise description of what we referred to as “match productivity” or “match quality” shocks
in terms of firm-specific and truly match-specific shocks. On the theoretical side, the introduction
38Even though these authors, along with much of the related contract literature, emphasize risk-sharing considera-
tions as the main driving force behind individual earnings dynamics, our model still bears a close formal relationship
to theirs. Malcomson (1997) indeed notes that the assumption of renegotiation by mutual consent squares in well
with the evidence documented in Beaudry and DiNardo (1991).
39Such derivations are available upon request.
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of permanent firm heterogeneity is a far-from-trivial extension of our model, as it complicates
the derivation and comparison of the workers’ valuation of employment at different firms by an
order of magnitude. On the empirical side, direct evidence on productivity shocks can in principle
be found in matched employer-employee data of the type used in Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis
(1999), Cahuc, Postel-Vinay and Robin (2004) or Guiso, Pistaferri and Schivardi (2005). In this
latter reference, the authors investigate in a reduced-form setting the pattern of correlation between
firm productivity shocks and individual wage shocks. Whether a job search model of the type we
describe in this paper can help to explain this empirical pattern remains an open question.
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APPENDIX
A The full theoretical model with forward-looking agents
In this appendix we show how the simple theory laid out in the main text can be amended in order to
properly account for the agents’ forward-looking behavior. We thus now assume that workers and firms are
infinitely lived, forward-looking, risk-neutral and have a common exogenous per-period discount factor of
ρ ∈ (0, 1).
More notation. The first thing that needs to be amended when considering ρ > 0 is notation. Given a
match between a firm and a type-p worker, with current productivity ε and current wage φ, we now denote
the worker’s valuation of this match will be denoted by V (φ, p), and the firm’s valuation by Π (ε, φ, p). V (·)
and Π (·) are now present discounted sums of future expected income or profit flows. We assume from the
outset that V (·) is increasing in φ and is independent of ε, while Π (·) is increasing in ε and is decreasing in
φ. The consistency of these assumptions will be verified later on. We still assume that a vacant job slot is
worth 0 to the firm, and we now denote the lifetime value of unemployment by V0 (p).
We define total match surplus as the value of the match relative to the combined value of a vacant job
and an unemployed worker:
S (ε, p) = [V (φ, p)− V0 (p)] + [Π (ε, φ, p)− 0] . (A1)
We shall start working under the provisional assumption that S (·) is independent of any wage value. This
will be shown later to be a consistent assumption given risk-neutrality of workers and firms and given
our (privately efficient) surplus-sharing mechanism.40 Moreover, total match surplus only depends on the
determinants of current and future match output flows. Given the assumed memoryless process for transitory
shocks ε, those only include the permanent component of match productivity, p, and the current value of its
transitory component, ε.
Wages and negotiation baselines. Given the rules of wage determination exposed in the main text
and given the definitions of the various relevant value functions in the previous paragraph, it is still the case
that all wages can be expressed as functions of the worker’s type p and a negotiation baseline r as follows:
φ = φ (r, p) ⇔ V (φ, p) = V0 (p) + S (r, p) . (A2)
Again, r measures the quality of the match from which the worker was last able to extract the whole surplus.
In functional terms, r is the inverse of the wage function r 7→ φ (r, p).
40Intuitively, total match surplus involves the present discounted sum of expected future flow values of match
surplus, which we saw in the main text are independent of any wage value.
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Finally notice that equation (A2) encompasses the special case of starting wages offered to unemployed
workers:
φ0 (p) = φ (r0, p) ⇔ V [φ0 (p) , p] = V0 (p) . (A3)
Unemployment value V0 (p). In any given period, an unemployed worker receives a flow income of
b ·p. In the following period, that same worker can either fail to meet a firm (an event of probability 1−λ0),
in which case s/he stays unemployed and gets a continuation value of V0 (p), or s/he can meet a firm and be
hired (probability λ0). In this latter case, our assumption that firms are able to extract the entire surplus
from newly formed matches implies that the worker’s continuation value from finding a job is again equal
to V0 (p). Hence, given the worker’s discount factor of ρ, the value of unemployment is simply defined by
V0 (p) = b · p+ ρ · V0 (p).
Total match surplus S (ε, p). As we saw in the main text, in any given period, the flow surplus from
a match between a firm and a type-p worker with current match-specific parameter ε is p · (ε− b).
If the match is dissolved in the following period, then the worker becomes unemployed and receives a
continuation value of V0 (p), while the employer is left with the option of opening a vacant job slot, which is
worth zero. Hence the continuation surplus of the firm-worker pair is zero in this case.
If the match is not dissolved, then given the new value of the transitory component of productivity ε′
the continuation surplus associated with the incumbent match is S (ε′, p). However, with probability λ1,
the worker meets a potential alternative employer with match quality η′ (drawn from M (·)) and associated
potential match surplus S (η′, p). As described in the main text, two configurations can arise. Either ε′ > η′,
in which case the worker stays with the incumbent firm (possibly under a renegotiated contract) with a
continuation surplus equal to S (ε′, p), or η′ > ε′ and the worker joins the poaching firm. In this latter case,
the incumbent firm is left with a value of 0 while Bertrand competition between the two employers implies
that the worker extracts all the surplus from the incumbent match, i.e. S (ε′, p). All this implies that the
sum of the worker’s continuation value and the incumbent firm’s continuation profits is equal to S (ε′, p),
whether an outside offer was raised by the worker or not.
Summing up, given a common discount factor of ρ for the worker and the employer, total match surplus
S (ε, p) is defined recursively by:
S (ε, p) = p · (ε− b) + ρ (1− δ) ·
∫ εmax
εmin
S (ε′, p) dM (ε′) = p ·
(
ε− b
1− ρ (1− δ)
+ ε− ε
)
, (A4)
where ε = EM (ε).
Before going any further, it is worth looking at the negotiation baseline r0 that workers start with when
they leave unemployment. Given (A3) and (A4), r0 satifies S (r0, p) = 0 and thus r0 =
b−ρ(1−δ)ε
1−ρ(1−δ) . Starting
wages φ0 (p) can then be expressed as φ (r0, p). Also note that r0 < b provided that ε > b, which is a
necessary condition for any trade at all to take place in the labor market.
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Worker value V (φ (r, p) , p). The current-period flow earnings of an employed worker is simply her/his
current wage φ (r, p). When the next period begins, with probability δ the match is hit by a dissolution
shock. In this case the worker becomes unemployed and therefore receives a continuation value of V0 (p).
With probability 1− δ, the worker stays employed and her/his continuation value depends on the new value
of her/his wage and hence on the new value of her/his negotiation baseline r′. Formally:
V [φ (r, p) , p] = φ (r, p) + ρ · [δV0 (p) + (1− δ)E (V [φ (r
′, p) , p] | r, continuing employment)]
= φ (r, p) + ρ · [V0 (p) + (1− δ)E (S (r
′, p)− S (r0, p) | r, continuing employment)]
= φ (r, p) + ρ · [V0 (p) + (1− δ) p · E (r
′ − r0 | r, continuing employment)] , (A5)
where the second equality uses S (r0, p) = 0 and the third one uses the formal expression of the match
surplus in (A4). The term E (r′ | r, continuing employment) appearing in (A5) hinges on the period-to-period
evolution of r, which was analyzed in the main text (see equation (5) and subsection 3.3). In particular, we
showed in equation (6) that:
E (r′ | r, continuing employment) = ε−
∫ rmax
r
(
M (r′)−
λ1
1− δ
M (r′)
2
)
dr′, (A6)
Substituting into (A5), we can express the worker’s value function as:
V (φ (r, p) , p)− V0 (p) = φ (r, p)− p ·
(
r0 + ρ (1− δ)
∫ rmax
r
(
M (r′)−
λ1
1− δ
M (r′)
2
)
dr′
)
. (A7)
Wage values. Combining equations (A2), (A4) and (A7), we now see that all wages have the following
form:
φ (r, p) = p ·
(
r + ρ (1− δ)
∫ rmax
r
(
M (r′)−
λ1
1− δ
M (r′)
2
)
dr′
)
, (A8)
with in particular entry wages being defined by φ0 (p) = φ (r0, p). The model with forward-looking agents thus
still predicts that log-wages are additively separable into a worker fixed effect ln p and a transitory/persistent
match-specific component:
v = v (r) = ln
(
r + ρ (1− δ)
∫ rmax
r
(
M (r′)−
λ1
1− δ
M (r′)
2
)
dr′
)
. (A9)
This transformation of r into v (r) substitutes the simpler r 7→ v = ln r that arose in the main text from
the ρ = 0 case. Equation (A9) still defines a monotonically increasing transformation of r, and as such
implies no substantial change for the analysis in sections 3 and above. In particular, idiosyncratic shocks
to the negotiation baseline r thus only impact wages through v = v (r). So knowledge of the sampling and
population distributions of v, denoted F (·) and G (·) respectively, is sufficient to simulate individual labor
market trajectories with our model. As we saw in the main text, it is more convenient to work with the
transformed negotiation baseline and match productivity shock—v (r) and v (ε)—than with the underlying
r and ε. Specifically, as the sampling distribution of ε is M (·), the corresponding distribution for v is simply
F (·) =M ◦ v−1 (·).
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B Derivation of theoretical moments
Derivation of Gs (·). We construct Gs (·) by induction. Considering the conditional distribution of
vt+1 | vt in (5), one has for any s ≥ 1:
gs+1 (v) =
[
F (v)−
λ1
1− δ
F (v)
2
]
· gs (v)−
[
f (v)−
2λ1
1− δ
f (v)F (v)
]
·Gs (v) + f (v) , (B1)
which integrates as:
Gs+1 (v) =
[
F (v)−
λ1
1− δ
F (v)
2
]
·Gs (v) + F (v) . (B2)
Given the initial condition G0 (·) ≡ G (·), this difference equation solves as (7) in the main text.
Taking up the expression in (7), it is straightforward to check that ∀v, G∞ (v) ≥ G (v), i.e. G∞ (·)
first-order stochastically dominates G (·). Integration by parts further shows that:
EGs (v) = v0 +
∫ vmax
v0
G∞ (x) dx−
∫ vmax
v0
(
F (x)−
λ1
1− δ
F (x)
2
)s
·
[
G∞ (x)−G (x)
]
dx, (B3)
which establishes that EGs (v) monotonically increases with s.
Derivation of Cov (lnφt, lnφt+s | employment at t, · · · , t+ s). We begin by the derivation of
the conditional expectation E (vt+s | vt, employment at t, · · · , t+ s). Even though this is not among the set
of moments we are eventually going to directly match in the estimation, its derivation is a useful intermediate
step.
It is straightforward to show using (5) that that for any differentiable function ϕ (·):
E [ϕ (vt+1) | vt, employment at t, t+ 1] = EF [ϕ (v)]−
∫ vmax
vt
ϕ′ (x) ·
(
F (x)−
λ1
1− δ
F (x)
2
)
dx. (B4)
Next defining Ts (vt) = E (vt+s | vt, employment at t, · · · , t+ s), the conditional prediction of the negoti-
ation baseline s periods ahead given vt and given continuous employment between dates t and t + s, one
notices that for any s ≥ 2:
Ts+1 (vt)≡E (vt+s+1 | vt, employment at t, · · · , t+ s+ 1)
=E [E (vt+s+1 | vt+1, employment at t+ 1, · · · , t+ s+ 1) | vt, employment at t, t+ 1]
=E [Ts (vt+1) | vt, employment at t, t+ 1] . (B5)
Reasoning by induction and differentiating (B4) shows that T ′s (vt) =
(
F (vt)−
λ1
1−δF (vt)
2
)s
. Substituting
back into (B4) and (B5) establishes the following for Ts (vt) = E (vt+s | vt, employment at t, · · · , t+ s):
Ts (vt) = EF [Ts−1 (v)]−
∫ vmax
vt
(
F (x)−
λ1
1− δ
F (x)
2
)s
dx. (B6)
Note that EF [Ts−1 (v)] is a deterministic term depending on the “prediction horizon” s only. Then from
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(B6) we directly obtain:41
Cov (lnφt, lnφt+s) = Var (ln p) + Cov (vt, vt+s)
= Var (ln p) + Cov (vt, E (vt+s | vt))
= Var (ln p)− Cov
(
vt,
∫ vmax
vt
(
F (x)−
λ1
1− δ
F (x)
2
)s
dx
)
. (B7)
Note that the distributions with respect to which expectations should be taken in all these moments are
distributions in the population of employed workers, meaning G (·) for the moments involving vt and H (·)
for those involving p.
41We continue to work conditionally on continuous employment between dates t and t + s. However, to avoid a
notational overload, we now keep this conditioning implicit.
38
Job spell sample: first spell
Initial state N. Obs.
Mean duration
(months)
% censored
% job-job
transitions
% job-un.
transitions
Employed 614 57.7 45.2 33.1 21.7
Unemployed 44 15.2 29.4 — —
Job spell sample: numbers of transitions
0 1 2 ≥ 3
Percent of sample 42.9 23.0 13.7 20.4
Income sample
N. Obs. Mean (1992) Std. Dev. (1992)
646
1.94
(£7.91 per hour)
0.50
(£4.91 per hour)
Table 1: Sample descriptive statistics
δ (×100) 1/δ λ1 (×100) 1/λ1 λ0 (×100) 1/λ0
0.326
(0.022)
307.0
(20.43)
1.574
(0.057)
63.5
(2.30)
4.55
(0.814)
22.0
(3.94)
Table 2: Transitions and mean spell durations (months)
Parameters of G (·) Test of OI restrictions:
v0 = vmin µ σ Var (ln p) σ
2
me Test Statistic
(df: p-value)
1.743
(0.056)
2.311
(0.015)
0.205
(0.028)
0.057
(0.008)
0.011
(0.006)
19.95
(27: 0.833)
Vs. σ2me 6= 0:
1.752
(0.056)
2.302
(0.019)
0.249
(0.015)
0.055
(0.008)
0.000
(const.)
22.69
(28: 0.748)
2.74
(1: 0.097)
Note: G (v) is parameterized as the sum of a mass of δ
δ+λ1
at v0 and a normal distribution of mean
µ and standard deviation σ truncated at vmin.
Table 3: Distributional parameters
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Cov (∆ lnφi,t,∆lnφi,t+s), s = . . .
0 1 2 3 4
BHPS 0.032
(0.001)
−0.009
(0.001)
−0.000
(0.001)
−0.001
(0.001)
0.000
(0.001)
Simulated 0.035
(0.001)
−0.009
(0.001)
−0.002
(0.001)
0.002
(0.001)
0.001
(0.001)
ARMA parameters: Test of OI rest.:
Var (ζi,t) Var (ξi,t) θ1 Test Statistic
(df: p-value)
BHPS 0.010
(0.001)
0.011
(0.001)
0.119
(0.045)
65.52
(52: 0.099)
Vs. θ1 6= 0:
0.011
(0.001)
0.009
(0.001)
0.000
(const.)
70.68
(53: 0.053)
5.13
(1: 0.023)
Simulated 0.011
(0.001)
0.012
(0.001)
0.110
(0.039)
63.76
(52: 0.127)
Vs. θ1 6= 0:
0.013
(0.001)
0.010
(0.000)
0.000
(const.)
69.38
(53: 0.065)
5.62
(1: 0.018)
Table 4: Fitting an ARMA process
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Time
Prevailing wage
Worker’s outside option.
(Corresponds to the value
of unemployment when
no outside offer is raised).
Maximum wage paid by the firm.
(Yields zero profit to the firm
and follows productivity shocks.)
Worker forces renegotiation
following an outside offer
Firm forces renegotiation
following an adverse
productivity shock
Efficient separation
following
an outside offer
Outside offers raising the worker’s outside option
Figure 1: The earnings process
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Figure 2: First- and second-order moments of the earnings process
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Figure 3: Distribution of year-to-year wage changes
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Figure 4: Wage autocovariances conditional on job-to-job mobility
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